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Abstract
We develop a model where consumers do not have ex-ante private
information on their risk but can decide to acquire such information be-
fore insurance policy purchase. Adverse selection can arise endogenously
in the insurance market. We focus on the case where information has
decision-making value: information allows consumers to optimally choose
a self-insurance action. We analyze insurance market response to endoge-
nous information and consumersincentive to search for such information.
Welfare costs caused by the lack of coverage against the risk to be a high
risk are analyzed. The case of genetic testing serves as an illustration.
1 Introduction
The standard assumption in insurance models is that consumers are perfectly
informed about their probability to incur a loss. In other words, individuals
perfectly observe their risk (type), while insures do not. In insurance markets
characterized by adverse selection, insurance rms o¤er self-selecting contracts:
the well-known Rothschild/Stiglitz equilibrium allows insurers to separate the
high- from the low-type consumers.
In many situations, however, consumers have only a vague perception of
their probability of incurring a loss: they do not have ex-ante superior informa-
tion. This is the case, for example, of health related risk. Nevertheless, recent
developments in medical science makes genetic tests for many diseases available
to consumers: whenever consumers choose to undertake a test, they decide to
acquire more precise information about their risk. This means that individuals
can learn information about their risk of illness before purchasing the insurance
contract: information is endogenous.
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna
(Italy). E-mail: barigozz@spbo.unibo.it
yEcole Centrale Marseille, GREQAM and IDEP, 2 rue de la Charité 13002 Marseille. E-
mail: henriet@univ-aix.fr
1
